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STATEMENT OF THE BASIS OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) for the Tenth Circuit, on its own
motion, in accordance with Utah R. App. P. 41, submitted a request to the Utah Supreme Court
to exercise its discretion to accept a certified question of Utah law in connection with an appeal
in this case then pending before the BAP. This Court issued an Order of Acceptance on
December 17, 2007.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
AND APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Whether, pursuant to Utah Code Anno. § 78-23-9 (1953), monies
refunded to a taxpayer as an overpayment of taxes are exempt when the monies
with which the tax deposit was made were exempt."
There is no factual dispute. The certified issue is a question of law subject to de novo review.

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Utah Code Anno. § 78-23-9. Exemption of proceeds from property sold, taken by
condemnation, lost, damaged, or destroyed ~ Tracing exempt property and proceeds.
(1) (a) An individual who owned property described in this Subsection (1) is entitled to an
exemption of proceeds that are traceable for one year after the compensation for the property is
received if:
(i) (A) the property, or a part of the property, could have been claimed exempt under
Subsection 78-23-5(l)(a)(i) or (ii); or
(B) the property is personal property subject to a value limitation under Subsection 78-238(l)(a),(b),or(c);and
(ii) the property has been:
(A) sold or taken by condemnation; or
(B) lost, damaged, or destroyed; and
(C) the owner has been compensated for the property.
(b) The exemption of proceeds under this Subsection (1) does not entitle the individual to claim
an aggregate exemption in excess of the value limitation otherwise allowable under Section 7823-3 or 78-23-8.
(2) Money or other property exempt under Subsection 78-23-5(l)(a)(iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii),
(xiii), or (xiv) remains exempt after its receipt by, and while it is in the possession of, the
individual or in any other form into which it is traceable.
(3) Money or other property and proceeds exempt under this chapter are traceable under this
section by application of:
(a) the principle of:
(i) first-in first-out; or
(ii) last-in last-out; or
(b) any other reasonable basis for tracing selected by the individual.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a bankruptcy case originated by the Debtor/Appellant filing a voluntary petition
under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Utah. The Appellee, who was appointed as the Chapter 7 trustee in this case, objected to the
Debtor/Appellant's claim that over-withheld exempt pension monies received back by her from
the tax authorities (tax refunds) remained exempt under Utah law. The Bankruptcy Court
sustained the Appellee/Trustee's objection to her exemption claim without addressing the Utah
tracing statute. Appeal was timely taken to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Tenth
Circuit, which certified the present question for determination by this Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
As presented in the Certification of Question of State Law by the three judge panel of the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Tenth Circuit, the facts are stated as follows:
The facts relevant to this matter are undisputed. In 2006 Appellant/Debtor Janerae F.
Smith's only source of income was distribution from social security and qualified pension plans
("exempt income") in the approximate amount of $50,031.00. On December 22, 2006, Smith
filed a case under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Appellee, R. Kimball Mosier was
appointed Chapter 7 Trustee ("Trustee").
3

Smith's income tax liability for 2006 was $3,746.00; however she withheld $7,058.00
from the exempt income she received and deposited these monies with the tax authorities. When
filing her tax returns, Smith discovered that she had overpaid her tax liability and was entitled to
a $3,312.00 refund. Subsequently, she filed an Amended Schedule B in her bankruptcy case,
simultaneously claiming that amount exempt under Utah Code Anno. § 78-23-5(l)(xiv) as
traceable proceeds from an exempt fund.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Pension monies are this retired Debtor/Appellant's only source of income. Such
retirement income type funds are exempt from creditor attachment. And, to give debtors further
protection for this specific type of property, the Utah legislature provided that such money
remains exempt "in any other form into which it is traceable." It doesn't matter that the funds
can no longer be labeled as a pension or retirement asset. It doesn't matter where they are.
Debtor/Appellant's pension funds were once indisputably exempt, and because they are traceable
on a "reasonable basis," they still remain exempt today. Reference to case law concerning
characterization is misplaced. The exemption was properly claimed.

4

ARGUMENT
Retirement funds of a debtor are exempt under Utah law from creditor attachment and
execution. That exemption serves an importance public purpose of protecting the often very
limited income of retired individuals from creditor claims. Utah Code Anno. § 78-23-9 provides
that the exemption is retained if the funds are traceable into another form. The Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Utah, in the case below referred to three opinions as justification for denial of
Debtor/Appellant's claimed exemption. Each of those cases, and many like them, ask whether
an asset retains an exemption after its character has been changed by a transfer or modification
into another form. None of those cases involved an additional statute mandating that exemption
continue into the changed form if it can be traced into the new asset. Just such a statute exists
here, but it was not considered by the bankruptcy court. That was error. The Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel for the Tenth Circuit has now certified the question of interpretation of Utah's
tracing statute for decision by this Court. The language is plain:

(2) Money or other property exempt under Subsection 78-23-5(l)(a)(iii), (iv), (v), (vi),
(vii), (xiii), or (xiv) remains exempt after its receipt by, and while it is in the possession
of, the individual or in any other form into which it is traceable.
(3) Money or other property and proceeds exempt under this chapter are traceable under
this section by application of:
(a) the principle of:
5

(i) first-in first-out; or
(ii) last-in last-out; or
(b) any other reasonable basis for tracing selected by the individual.
Utah Code Anno. § 78-23-9 (emphasis added).
Here, the original funds were exempt because they constituted "money or other assets
held for, or payable to, the individual as a participant or beneficiary from or an interest of the
individual as a participant or beneficiary in a retirement plan or arrangement that is described in
Section 401(a) [or] 414(d)...." Utah Code Anno. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(xiv). The Debtor/Appellant
does not contend that the funds forever remained the type of assets described in (a)(xiv) - or that
they retained forever the same characterization. She does not need to. Instead, the Utah
legislature anticipated the probability that exempt assets may be converted into otherwise nonexempt assets. To give further protection, the lawmakers provided specific additional protection
to certain favored classes of the original exempt assets. The Debtor/Appellant's retirement funds
are within that protection. They are in one of the favored categories or classes that are traceable.
So long as they are traceable on a reasonable basis1, the exemption must be allowed, regardless
6

during the relevant time period, the Debtor had not either paid in, or received out, from
the tax authorities, any other amounts besides the $3,746 of taxes paid, and $3,312 of overwithheld amounts. All such amounts derived from her pensions. Under either of the statutory
specified tracing methods, FIFO or LIFO, the $3,312 amount to be returned to her by the taxing
authorities is traceable to, and clearly came from, the Debtor's retirement funds.

of the present location2 or characterization.
"When a Utah statute grants an exemption, the Utah Supreme Court has consistently
applied a liberal construction in favor of debtors to protect debtors and their families from
hardship. Miller v. Givan, 7 Utah 2d 380, 325 P. 2d 908 (1958); Spangler v. Corless, 61 Utah 88,
211 P. 692 (1922); Lindquist v. Clayton, 54 Utah 79, 179 P. 655 (1919)." In re Neiheisel 32
B.R. 146, 167-168 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983) (the Neiheisel opinion contains a lengthy and scholarly
analysis of exemption laws by Chief Bankruptcy Judge Glen E. Clark, District of Utah).
The Debtor's social security and pension payment amounts were all exempt when and as
received during 2006, and the court should properly determine that they remain exempt today, in
the form of the refund she receives back from the tax authorities. Conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558, 101 L. Ed. 2d 490, 108 S. Ct. 2541
(1988); Dunivent v. Bechtoldt (In reBechtoldt), 210 B.R. 599, 600 (Bankr. Fed. App. 1997);
Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69 (UT 2002).
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah in this case below, referred in its ruling to
three cases, which are summarized and distinguished below.
7
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If the Debtor had chosen to reduce or eliminate her income tax withholding she could
have deposited those funds into a bank account. Since she had no other source of income, all of
her additional bank deposits for the reduced or eliminated withholding would be traceable clearly
and directly from the retirement funds. The fact that her retirement funds were deposited with
the tax authorities, simply a different location, name, and form, should not alter that result.

In Carbaugh v. Carbaugh (In re Carbaugh), 278 B.R. 512, 521 (10th Cir. BAP 2002), the
Trustee and that Debtor's ex-wife both objected to an exemption claimed with respect to the
$51,000 portion of a lump sum retirement distribution placed by the Debtor in an investment
account. Seeking to reverse the Bankruptcy Court disallowance of his exemption claim, that
Debtor argued under both federal and state law that the exemption should be traceable to its
origin essentially on equitable principles. The BAP rejected these arguments, finding no
exemption under ERISA, the Kansas retirement exemptions statute, or the Kansas wage
garnishments statute. None of those statutes contain an accompanying tracing provision as does
the Utah statute. However, the BAP did footnote:
Additionally, we note that it is unsettled in Kansas whether the Debtor could even claim
an exemption on wages after they were placed in a checking account. Compare In re
Adcock, 264 B.R. 708 (D. Kan. 2000) (finding that under the wage garnishment
exemption statute, a debtor could claim an exemption on wages only until they were
deposited in a debtor's checking account, reasoning that after the wages were deposited
they lost their character as earnings on the grounds that 60-2310(b) protects only those
wages held by the employer), with In re Urban, 262 B.R. 865, 870 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2001)
(disagreeing with Adcock and finding that Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-2310 provides an
exemption for wages that have been deposited in a checking account until they are
untraceable or commingled).
Carbaugh, 278 B.R. at 524 (footnote 10).
Thus, even without a specific comparable tracing statute, some courts extend an
exemption to traceable proceeds. Reference to case law and such equitable concepts and
8

principles is not needed here, however, because there is a clearly controlling statute, Utah Code
Anno. § 78-23-9, which expressly requires tracing.
The bankruptcy court below also referred to Dicker son v. Manchester (In re Dicker son),
227 B.R. 742, 743 (10th Cir. BAP 1998), where the following question is answered by the BAP:
Are funds that a debtor receives from the United States as a result of qualifying for an
earned income credit "earnings from personal service" as used in Okla. Stat. tit. 31, §
1.1. A, and thus property that is exempt from administration in this bankruptcy estate? We
conclude the funds are not earnings from personal services and are not exempt under
Oklahoma law. We therefore affirm the ruling of the bankruptcy court.
Finally, in Manchester v. Annis (In re Annis), 229 B.R. 802, 805 (10th Cir. BAP 1999),
the bankruptcy court had held that the tax refund was exempt under the Oklahoma hardship
exemption for earnings from personal services, finding that "monies retain their status as
earnings albeit in the possession of the government." Again, the focus in Annis was on status,
location, or characterization, not tracing. Because tracing was not involved, the BAP quite
correctly reversed the bankruptcy court concluding "that the Debtors tax refund in this case is
not 'earnings from personal services' within the meaning of the Oklahoma statute and the
Debtor's claimed exemption must be denied." 229 B.R. at 805.
The Debtor/Appellant here has absolutely no disagreement with the principles set forth in
Carbaugh, Dickerson, and Annis. But, they are simply not applicable. None of those cases
involved a state statute specifically providing for tracing of exempt funds into a different form or
location. Utah does. Utah Code Anno. § 78-23-9, specifically provides that money from an
9

otherwise exempt pension fund "remains exempt... in any other form into which it is
traceable." Accordingly, reference to cases focusing on the "form" or "status" of the asset,
rather than on tracing it, is misplaced. Instead, "[i]t is well established that when the statute's
language is plain, the sole function of the courts - at least where the disposition required by the
text is not absurd - is to enforce it according to its terms." (Internal quotation marks and citations
omitted.). Hodes v. Jenkins (In re Hodes), 308 B.R. 61, 68-69 (10th Cir. BAP 2004); quoting
Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1024, 124 S. Ct. 1023, 1030 (2004).
The meaning of Utah Code Anno. § 78-23-9 is plain. This court should answer the
certified question and interpret the statute according to its plain terms, finding that the
Debtor/Appellant's pension funds are traceable and therefore remain exempt.
When interpreting a statute, the language of the statute is first examined. Zeigler Eng'g
Sales, Inc. v. Cozad (In re Cozad), 208 B.R. 495 (10th Cir. BAP 1997) (citing Dalton v.
Internal Revenue Service, 11 F.3d 1297, 1299 (10th Cir. 1996)). Language is given its
common meaning if the unambiguous statutory language is not defined and the result is
not absurd or contrary to the legislative purpose. Id. (citing Dalton, 11 F.3d at 1299).
When interpreting exemption statutes, the interpretation must further the spirit of such
laws. Specifically the court must be "guided by the general principle that exemption
statutes are to be liberally construed so as to effect their beneficent purposes." [Citations
omitted]
Dunivent v. Bechtoldt (In re Bechtoldt), 210 B.R. 599, 601 (10th Cir. BAP 1997); see also:
Miller v. Givan, 1 Utah 2d 380, 325 P. 2d 908 (1958); Spangler v. Corless, 61 Utah 88, 211 P.
692 (1922); Lindquist v. Clayton, 54 Utah 79, 179 P. 655 (1919).
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The language of Utah Code Anno. § 78-23-9 is "unambiguous," and the result
sought in the Bankruptcy Court by the Debtor/Appellant is consistent with "the general principle
that exemption statutes are to be liberally construed so as to effect their beneficent purposes."
Pensions were Debtor/Appellant's only source of income and only source of tax refunds. The
funds at issue here are traceable only to the pensions. The legislature decreed that they should
remain exempt. The Bankruptcy Court below made an erroneous legal conclusion in ignoring
the statutory tracing provision and improperly focusing instead on irrelevant cases that concern
characterization. The Trustee's objection concerning Debtor/Appellant's traceable funds in the
amount of $3,312 should ultimately be rejected, and the lower court's legal conclusion reversed.
To get there, this Court should now answer the certified question in the affirmative, interpreting
the plain language of the statute so that tax refunds from an exempt source remain exempt from
creditor attachment or execution when returned to the taxpayer from the tax authorities.

CONCLUSION

The Debtor/Appellant prays that the Utah State Supreme Court answer the certified
question by determining that her pension monies are traceable into her tax refund, and should
therefore continue to be exempt.

DATED this

5 TH t day of March, 2008

J U ^ ^ C ^ ^ ^ ^
/^^JD^TMILLER
Attorney for Debtor/Appellant
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ADDENDUM - Text of Relevant Statutes:
§ 78-23-9. Exemption of proceeds from property sold, taken by condemnation, lost, damaged, or
destroyed — Tracing exempt property and proceeds
(1) (a) An individual who owned property described in this Subsection (1) is entitled to an
exemption of proceeds that are traceable for one year after the compensation for the property is
received if:
(i) (A) the property, or a part of the property, could have been claimed exempt under
Subsection 78-23-5(l)(a)(i) or (ii); or
(B) the property is personal property subject to a value limitation under Subsection 78-238(l)(a),(b),or(c);and
(ii) the property has been:
(A) sold or taken by condemnation; or
(B) lost, damaged, or destroyed; and
(C) the owner has been compensated for the property.
(b) The exemption of proceeds under this Subsection (1) does not entitle the individual to claim
an aggregate exemption in excess of the value limitation otherwise allowable under Section 7823-3 or 78-23-8.
(2) Money or other property exempt under Subsection 78-23-5(1 )(a)(iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii),
(xiii), or (xiv) remains exempt after its receipt by, and while it is in the possession of, the
individual or in any other form into which it is traceable.
(3) Money or other property and proceeds exempt under this chapter are traceable under this
section by application of:
(a) the principle of:
(i) first-in first-out; or
(ii) last-in last-out; or
(b) any other reasonable basis for tracing selected by the individual.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 78-23-9, enacted by L. 1981, ch. I l l , § 9; 1989, ch. 19, § 2; 1998, ch. 13, §
96; 2005, ch. 234, § 2.
NOTES:
AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, updated the subsection
references in Subsections (1) and (2).
The 2005 amendment, effective May 2, 2005, rewrote Subsection (1) without substantial
change; substituted "(vii), (xiii), or (xiv)" for "or exempt to the extent reasonably necessary for
support under Section 78-23-6" in Subsection (2); and subdivided Subsection (3).

§ 78-23-5. Property exempt from execution
(1) (a) An individual is entitled to exemption of the following property:
(i) a burial plot for the individual and the individual's family;
(ii) health aids reasonably necessary to enable the individual or a dependent to work or
sustain health;
(iii) benefits the individual or the individual's dependent have received or are entitled to
receive from any source because of:
(A) disability;
(B) illness; or
(C) unemployment;
(iv) benefits paid or payable for medical, surgical, or hospital care to the extent they are used
by an individual or the individual's dependent to pay for that care;
(v) veterans benefits;
(vi) money or property received, and rights to receive money or property for child support;
(vii) money or property received, and rights to receive money or property for alimony or
separate maintenance, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the individual and the
individual's dependents;
(viii) (A) one:
(I) clothes washer and dryer;
(II) refrigerator;
(III) freezer;
(IV) stove;
(V) microwave oven;
(VI) sewing machine;
(B) all carpets in use;
(C) provisions sufficient for 12 months actually provided for individual or family use;
(D) all wearing apparel of every individual and dependent, not including jewelry or furs;
and
(E) all beds and bedding for every individual or dependent;
(ix) except for works of art held by the debtor as part of a trade or business, works of art:
(A) depicting the debtor or the debtor and his resident family; or
(B) produced by the debtor or the debtor and his resident family;
(x) proceeds of insurance, a judgment, or a settlement, or other rights accruing as a result of
bodily injury of the individual or of the wrongful death or bodily injury of another individual of
whom the individual was or is a dependent to the extent that those proceeds are compensatory;
(xi) the proceeds or benefits of any life insurance contracts or policies paid or payable to the
debtor upon the death of the spouse or children of the debtor, provided that the contract or policy

has been owned by the debtor for a continuous unexpired period of one year;
(xii) the proceeds or benefits of any life insurance contracts or policies paid or payable to the
spouse or children of the debtor upon the death of the debtor, provided that the contract or policy
has been in existence for a continuous unexpired period of one year;
(xiii) proceeds and avails of any unmatured life insurance contracts owned by the debtor,
excluding any payments made on the contract during the one year immediately preceding a
creditor's levy or execution;
(xiv) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), any money or other assets held for or payable
to the individual as a participant or beneficiary from or an interest of the individual as a
participant or beneficiary in a retirement plan or arrangement that is described in Section 401(a),
401(h), 401(k), 403(a), 403(b), 408, 408A, 409, 414(d), or 414(e), Internal Revenue Code; and
(xv) the interest of or any money or other assets payable to an alternate payee under a
qualified domestic relations order as those terms are defined in Section 414(p), Internal Revenue
Code.
(b) The exemption granted by Subsection (l)(a)(xiv) does not apply to:
(i) an alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order, as those terms are defined in
Section 414(p), Internal Revenue Code; or
(ii) amounts contributed or benefits accrued by or on behalf of a debtor within one year
before the debtor files for bankruptcy. This may not include amounts directly rolled over from
other funds which are exempt from attachment under this section.
(2) The exemptions in Subsections (l)(a)(xi), (xii), and (xiii) do not apply to proceeds and avails
of any matured or unmatured life insurance contract assigned or pledged as collateral for
repayment of a loan or other legal obligation.
(3) Exemptions under this section do not limit items that may be claimed as exempt under
Section 78-23-8.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 78-23-5, enacted by L, 1981, ch. I l l , §5; 1989, ch. 19, § 1; 1997, ch. 138,
§ 2; 1999, ch. 370, § 2; 2004, ch. 135, § 2; 2005, ch. 234, § 1.
NOTES:
AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 2004 amendment, effective May 3, 2004, added the last sentence
in Subsection (l)(b)(ii).
The 2005 amendment, effective May 2, 2005, added Subsections (l)(a)(vii), (l)(a)(xi) to (xiii),
and (2), and made related and stylistic changes throughout.
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